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 1 
Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Salazar, ___F. Supp. 2d ___, 2011 WL 3330821  
(D. Mont. Aug. 3, 2011). 
 
Talasi Brooks 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Salazar,
1
 the plaintiffs, non-profit environmental 
associations, challenged the constitutionality of a rider attached to the Defense Appropriations 
bill that required the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to reissue a rule the United States 
District Court for the District of Montana had previously found invalid.
2
  The 2009 FWS rule 
removed Endangered Species Act (ESA) protections from the Northern Rocky Mountain gray 
wolf (gray wolf) in all northern rocky states except Wyoming.
3
   The court held that the re-
issuance of the 2009 rule pursuant to congressional direction amended the ESA, viewed through 
the lens of Ninth Circuit precedent.  Therefore, it did not raise Separation of Powers concerns.
4
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The court overturned the FWS’s “2009 rule,” which removed ESA protections from 
population segments of gray wolves outside of Wyoming, in Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar
5
 
(Defenders).
6
  In Defenders, the court found the 2009 rule violated the ESA because the ESA 
does not permit treating part of the protected wolf population differently for the purposes of 
“recovery.”7  In response, Congress attached a rider to the Department of Defense and Full Year 
Continuing Appropriations Act of 2011, which directed the FWS to reissue the 2009 rule.
8
  The 
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 2 
FWS reissued the rule on May 5, 2011.
9
  Two groups of plaintiffs sued and the actions were 
consolidated.
10
  The plaintiffs argued the appropriations rider violated the Separation of Powers 
doctrine because it would moot pending litigation without amending the ESA.
11
  The FWS relied 
on Ninth Circuit precedent that suggested Congress could involve itself in pending litigation and 
exempt a project from environmental laws impliedly by including the language “notwithstanding 
any other provision of law.”12  
III.  ANALYSIS 
 The court’s decision hinged on whether the rider changed the law or directed a particular 
application of existing law in violation of the Separation of Powers doctrine.
13
  If the rider 
changed the law and directed courts to apply the new law, it was acceptable.  However, if the 
rider directed application of existing law, it unconstitutionally infringed on the power of the 
judiciary.
14
  The court began by reviewing the tripartite structure of government proscribed by 
the Constitution as a means for administering the rule of law and emphasized the role of courts 
and precedent.
15
   
 Next, the court discussed U.S. v. Klein
16
 and Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society,
17
 two 
cases in which the Supreme Court has laid out a framework to assess whether the legislative 
branch has stepped into the judiciary’s domain.18  In Klein, the Court held that the legislature 
could not direct the courts to make a particular finding as to the probative weight of a fact central 
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 3 
to a proceeding.
19
  The Klein Court distinguished its holding from its decision in Pennsylvania v. 
Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.,
20
 in which it upheld a statute that characterized two bridges as 
lawful, when a court had previously found otherwise.
21
  The key fact, the Court explained, was 
that in Wheeling Bridge, the court could simply apply its normal rules to new circumstances 
created by the legislation.
22
  Conversely, in Klein, the legislation directed a particular result to 
the Court’s application of existing law.23  The court in Klein found this a violation of the 
Separation of Powers doctrine.
24
  In a more recent, decision, Robertson v. Seattle Audubon 
Society,
25
 the Court held that legislation affecting the outcome of a case was lawful as long as it 
“compelled changes in law, not findings or results under old law.”26   
In the case at bar, the court would have found that the 2009 rule violated the Klein 
standard, but other binding Ninth Circuit precedent required a different outcome.
27
  The Ninth 
Circuit previously held that a project may be exempted from environmental requirements 
regardless of whether such exemption is consistent with the policy purpose of the applicable 
legislation.
28
  By inserting limiting language, such as “notwithstanding any other provision of 
law,”29 the legislature may imply a narrow change to a legislative mandate.30  Thus, the 
legislature may amend legislation by implication and avoid unlawfully directing application of 
existing law. 
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 4 
While repeals based on implied changes are disfavored, they are not prohibited.
31
  
According to Robertson and the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, when a statute can be 
interpreted as either constitutional or unconstitutional, the court should apply the interpretation 
that renders the statute constitutional.
32
  Since a view that the statute requiring reissuing the 2009 
rule as constitutional was “possible,” the court granted the federal defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment and upheld the statute.
33
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 In Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Salazar, the court upheld what it believed was an 
erroneous precedent in the interest of preserving the rule of law.  The opinion stated:  “[I]n my 
view [the doctrine of Separation of Powers] is violated when there is an effort to change a 
political policy by resolution that is not clear, does not identify what law is specifically being 
changed, does not state what rules apply in the future, and is inconsistent with the underlying 
political purposes of the law that is being changed.”34  The court advances a compelling critique 
of the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Supreme Court precedent around the Separation of 
Powers doctrine. 
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